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The author surveys a number of factors 
responsible for Saudi Arabian econo-
mic growth and concludes that, con-
trary to popular belief, the petroleum 
sectors have had more than just a 
short-run transitory stimulating impact 
on the domestic economy. It appears 
thatchangesinthelevelofexports(and 
resulting government expenditures) 
have a number of impacts on the non-
oil sector of the economy which take 
some time for their full effect to be felt. 
Government expenditures have be-
come somewhat independent of current 
oil exports, so the current oil glut and 
falling revenues for Saudi Arabia are 
not likely to be translated into slower 
non-oil income growth. 
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Methodological 
considerations in fore-
casting Saudi Arabian 
economic growth 
Robert E. Looney 
During the 1970s the world economy was dominated by low growth 
rates and rapid inflation. With the exception of Japan among the 
industrialized nations, and Singapore, Taiwan, Brazil and South Korea 
among the developing nations, the world's economies experienced little 
economic growth. Even among the oil producing and exporting 
countries, economic development was erratic and below expectations. 
Nigeria and Mexico now face major crises. Several OPEC members 
have had to borrow in the world money markets to cover balance of 
payment deficits and continue the planned pace of economic 
development. 1 The UK has been unable to reverse its economic decline, 
despite the revenues it has received from the sale of North Sea Oil. 
Saudi Arabia has been the exception.2 From 1970 to 1980 two five 
year development plans were successfully completed and a third five 
year plan was implemented. The magnitude of the change wrought 
during the 1970s was astounding- during the first plan period (1970-75) 
the 13.5% growth rate of gross domestic product (GDP) exceeded the 
projected GDP rate of 9.8%, while during the second five year plan 
(1975-80) the non-oil sector grew at an annual rate of 15.l % instead of 
the projected 13.3%. 
As a •result of this expansion the non-oil sector's share in GDP 
increased for the first time - measured in current dollars the non-oil 
share in GDP rose from 20.7% to 37.8% while the percentage share of 
oil fell from 79.3% to 62.2% during the same time period. 
In spite of Saudi Arabia's many current economic successes there are 
reasons to believe that the era of high Saudi economic growth has come 
to an end. Saudi Arabia's economy is presently (1983) seen to be at 
something of a watershead for the following reasons: 
e The kingdom is nearing the completion stage of the massive 
construction and infrastructure projects begun in the mid 1970s. 
e Oil production and revenues have recently fallen off sharply, ie in 
1981 Saudi Arabia was pumping oil at over 10 million bbl/day 
constituting nearly 40% of OPEC's output at the time and over 20% 
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of the non-Communist world's output. In the first quarter of 1983 its 
average had dropped to 3.67 million bbl/day or 24% of a greatly 
diminished OPEC flow and 8% of a significantly reduced global 
total. 
The slowdown in economic activity is to be expected for a number of 
reasons: 
e The government claims that the bulk of five-year expenditure 
volumes has already been committed, a large part on projects rolled 
over from the second plan. 
e Average annual growth targets for the 1980-85 period have been 
greatly exceeded. in the first two years. 
e The administration is supposed to be pressing through with a 
deliberate programme to limit the number of expatriate workers, 
even at the cost of a slowdown in project implementation; and 
revenue expectations might be supposed to introduce a degree of 
caution following the experience of budget deficits in the late 1970s. 
Given these developments the following sections discuss a number of 
methodological issues that must be taken into account before making 
any assessment of the country's future pace of economic expansion. 
These include: 
e Determining the options open to the kingdom with regards to 
development strategy. • 
e Selecting, given the preferences of the Saudi authorities, the general 
growth strategy that is likely to characterize the country's pattern of 
economic development in the near future and in particular the 
feasibility of a slow-down in economic growth. 
e Identifying the likely levels of oil production and revenues together 
with their impact on the economy. This step entails quantifying the 
mechanisms which have been largely responsible for Saudi Arabian 
growth. 
The long-run Saudi development strategy 
The cornerstone of Saudi Arabia's long-run strategy of development is 
now well established. In essence, the strategy consists of the timed 
channelling of resources earned by the petroleum sector into expanding 
the non-oil production base.3 This in turn has involved anticipating 
several likely eventualities. 
First, an expanding economy requires an increasing flow of resources 
to 111aintain its momentum, given: (1) estimates of known oil reserves; 
(2) the likely expansion of needs for domestic energy sources, and (3) 
the plans to supply the petrochemical industry and refineries with 
enough crude oil and gas to meet domestic and export requriements. 
Second, because oil reserves are not infinite, Saudi Arabia has begun 
to prepare for the day when its hydrocarbons will have been 
economically depleted. Saudi Arabia still has by far the largest reserves 
of crude petroleum in the world - more than six times those of the USA. 
While there are probably around 530000 million barrels of oil remaining 
in the country's fields, only about half of this is economically 
recoverable (possible reserves) with current technology. The proved 
reserves are currently estimated at 163 350 million barrels and about 
50% of this oil consists of light crude (340 API). In addition, Saudi 
Arabia's natural gas reserves, estimated at 93.23 trillion cubic feet, are 
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very substantial by world standards. Nevertheless, even these vast 
amounts of hydrocarbons are finite. If the rate of extraction of oil 
returns to around 10 million bbl/day production in the four main 
producing fields - Ghawar, Abquiq, Berri and Safaniyah - will start to 
decline in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Considerable new investment 
will then be required to develop n'ew fields if the overall level of output 
is not to decline. On the assumption that this investment is made, it 
should be possible to maintain production until the middle of the next 
century. Thus, in about 70 years from now the overall level of petroleum 
production will gradually begin to fall off. 4 Long before then, the 
investment requirements needed to maintain production will have 
resulted in an end to the present pattern of relatively easy growth 
(probably around the end of this century). 
Third, the longer term problem of economic diversification is 
intimately tied with Saudi Arabia's strategy of economic development 
and the possibilities for developing an international comparative 
advantage in the production of certain commodities. Of the productive 
sectors - agriculture, industry and mines, and services - only certain 
industrial and mining activities (given the country's high wage structure 
and distance from markets) offer even the slightest possibility of 
becoming significant earners of foreign exchange. The possibilities for 
growth in the most traditional sectors, such as agriculture and livestock, 
are extremely limited, due not only to the shortages of water and arable 
land but also, and perhaps more importantly, to the sufficient number of 
Saudis who are willing to pursue a career in farming. · 
Economies of scale also preclude Saudi Arabia from undertaking an 
efficient, comprehensive import substitution programme. Pending a 
major breakthrough in technology, local production will continue to 
meet only a small proportion of domestic needs. In fact, if anything, the 
gap between domestic production and consumption is likely to increase 
over time. 
Saudi Arabia will have to adjust to an environment where growth will 
be ever more dependent on the mobilization of domestic resources and 
alternative (non-crude based) taxes. In other words, the public sector 
will have to diversify its revenue sources, and the private sector will 
have to reach a level of sophistication capable of generating a large 
proportion of its own investment funds. Establishing the elimination of 
oil as an adequate and easy source of savings will necessitate 
improvements in productive efficiency and a more rational allocation of 
domestic investment than is currently taking place. 
Finally, given the limited number of linkages within its productive 
structure!, any increase in Saudi Arabia's GDP will require increased 
imports to maintain the economy's growth momentum. Thus, by around 
2005-2010 Saudi Arabia will have had to develop a number of new and 
viable export industries, capable of earning enough adequate foreign 
exchange to meet import needs. While this situation is generally true of 
all non-renewable resource exporters, it is especially true for Saudi 
Arabia; its small domestic market, the limited non-petroleum resource 
base, and shortages of Saudi workers preclude developing a number of 
industries capable of assuring the country greater domestic self-
sufficiency. This applies particularly to the establishment of a group of 
capital goods industries to enable domestic entrepreneurs to channel 
their domestic savings into investment in plant and capacity irrespective 
of possible foreign exchange shortages. 5 
111 
Methodological considerations in forecasting Saudi Arabian economic growth 
6 Eliyahu Kanousky, 'The diminishing im-
portance of Middle East oil: a harbinger of 
the future?', in Colin Legom et al, Middle 
East Contemporary Survey, Vol VI, 1980-
81, Holmes and Meier, New York, 1982, pp 
377-379. 
7See, for example, Alan Brown, 'A note on 
the consumption function in Iran', Oxford 
Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 
February 1978, pp 1-8. 
8 Excellent up-to-date discussions of the 
country's planning efforts are given in 
Howard Bowen-Jones, 'The third Saudi 
Arabian five year plan', The Arab Gulf 
Journal, October 1981, pp 55-70; and 
Ragaei El Mallakh and Dorothea H. El 
Mallakh, 'The third development plan of 
Saudi Arabia, 1400-1405/1980-1985 AD', 
in Ragaei El Mallakh and Dorothea H. El 
Mallakh, Saudi Arabia: Energy, Develop-
ment Planning and Industrialization, Lex-
ington Books, Lexington, MA, 1982, pp 
117-192. 
9
'Saudi Arabia survey', Financial Times, 
28 April 1980, p X. 
10Saudi Arabia Supplement, Financial 
Times, 5 May 1981, pp I and V. 
11 Kanousky, op cit, Ref 6, p 380. 
Whether oil will enable Saudi Arabia to cope with these eventualities 
will in the long run depend almost entirely on the government's 
expenditure strategy and the response of the private sector. 
Preferences of the government's short-run growth strategy 
If there is a more or less consistent pattern in the actions of any 
government, one may conclude that this pattern presents policy -
whether or not it accords with public statements. The only conclusion 
about the Saudi leaders' policy is that they wish to spend the oil revenue 
as rapidly as is feasible. 6 This was the policy during the 1960s and 
despite far higher levels of income in the 1970s the modus operandi 
remained essentially unchanged. Between 1970 and 1973 Saudi produc-
tion and exports doubled, with the biggest increment taking place in 
1973 - despite a cutback in the last quarter of the year. Oil revenues 
increased even more rapidly, since prices were rising, beginning in 1971. 
The price escalation in 1973-74 raised Saudi revenues to unpre-
cedented dimensions. This was the period when foreign analysts were 
projecting huge OPEC financial surpluses - accumulating into the 1980s 
or beyond - with the Saudis capturing the lion's share. The widespread 
view amongst analysts was that the Saudis (and other major Middle 
Eastern oil exporters with small populations) were 'small absorbers' of 
revenues, unable to spend all the money they had made and, general\y, 
their 'absorptive capacity was very limited'. 
In actuality the Saudis have managed to spend oil revenues at rates 
even greater than that of Iran under the late Shah,7 and Saudi 
expenditure performance lends credence to the argument that the 
behaviour of governments with respect to income and expenditures is 
not very different from that of individuals, ie when incomes rise, and the 
higher incomes are viewed as either permanent or long term, it is almost 
certain that individual expenditure increases will not be far behind. 
When oil revenues rose dramatically in 1974 the Saudis adopted, almost 
immediately, a massive Five-Year Plan designed, firstly, to raise the 
living standards and educational and health services of wide segments of 
the population; secondly, to improve the economy, especially through 
major industrial projects to reduce the country's almost total depend-
ence on oil revenues; and, thirdly, to effect a significant expansion and 
modernization of the armed forces. 8 
While permanent income theory may hold some validity for expand-
ing oil revenues, it is not clear however that it is equally applicable in 
explaining the Saudi response to falling revenues. While the Saudis 
migb.t curb the growth rates of expenditures and imports, a cutback in 
real terms would pose serious dangers for their regime. No official data 
on income distribution are available, but unofficial reports state that 
'the inequities in income are perhaps unprecedented in history'. 9 Such 
reports suggest that middle class elements are complaining 'that too big 
a proportion of the oil wealth is profiting a minority of entrep-
reneurs ... [and] as a result Saudi expectations have become danger-
ously inflexible.' 10 The sensitivity of Saudi leaders to these problems 
was exacerbated by the Mecca incident and the violent protest of 
Shi'ites who reside mainly in the oil producing region. 11 
12Edmond O'Sullivan, 'Adapting and sur-
viving in an era of change', Middle East • 
Economic Digest, Saudi Arabia: Special 
Report, August 1982, pp 2-6. 
Recent budgets have brought about the following changes:12 
Direct subsidies for food and services were raised by 78% in the 
1980-81 budget. 
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e Allocations for municipal services were increased by one third in the 
1980-81 budget. 
e The public administration budget was increased. 
e The already overdeveloped bureaucracy is to be expanded by an 
additional 100000 during the 1980-85 plan period. 
In a country whose total domestic labour force is less than one milliQn, 
this last item constitutes a major and costly expansion. This policy is not 
determined by any need for more public servants but is primarily to 
provide the kind of white collar jobs preferred by educated Saudis. 
Fulfilling Saudi expectations requires a continued investment in 
infrastructure and in services. To cite but one example, absurdly low 
prices are charged for electricity, water, gasoline, etc. The result is a 
rapid growth in consumption which in turn requires further public 
investment in services. 
Foreign aid might be one area where cutbacks could take place, but 
these are limited and would have only a marginal effect on total 
spending. According to the balance of payments, actual disbursements 
of foreign aid (grants plus loans) over the six-year period, 1975-80, 
averaged $3.6 billion per annum. As a percentage of revenues from oil 
exports, this figure showed a sharp decline from 11.5% in 1975 to 4.0% 
in 1980. 
Most Saudi economic aid is determined by the country's perception of 
defense considerations. 13 Aid to Pakistan is to a large extent an indirect 
payment for the services of thousands of Pakistani personnel in Saudi 
Arabia. Aid to neighbouring countries, such as the Yemen Arab 
Republic and Oman, is designed to maintain stability on its borders. 
Disbursements to Palestinian organizations are important, among other 
reasons for maintaining the Saudi Royal Family's role in the Arab world 
and to keep the large number of Palestinian workers in the country 
relatively quiescent. 
In summary, aid allocations seem to be at a level where further 
reductions are not politically feasible. 
Saudi expenditures and imports are therefore related to four factors: 
(1) the rising expectations of the Saudis, (2) the cost of a rising number 
of foreign labourers, (3) the commitment to industrialization, and (4) 
large-scale military and internal security spending. Any serious attempt 
to cut back spending seriously would clearly be fraught with dangerous 
consequences for the regime. The five year plan called for budgetary 
expenditures of $392 billion in April 1981, and a year after the plan was 
announced the Deputy Minister of Planning stated that actual spending 
would be.15% higher. The sharp increase in allocations in the 1981-82 
budget suggests that expenditures might be at least 25% higher than 
planned. 14 
It is therefore apparent that the Saudi government will make every 
effort to avoid an economic recession, however short-lived. The idea of 
a more permanent slow-down of the economy is also very difficult for 
Saudi planners to reconcile with the promise of continuous growth in 
economic activity and high living standards, which are two of the 
cornerstones of the government's general economic policy. In the short 
term the government will be well aware that past applications of a brake 
on government spending in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s have always 
tended to have the most detrimental effect on lower income Saudis; 
strikes and other forms of unrest have occurred and, although the 
causality implied above can be questioned, there is no doubt that the 
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government has good reason to try and avoid even potentially similar 
economic situations in the 1980s. 
But in the 1980s it would not only be the lower income Saudis who 
would be affected by a decline in government expenditure. There would 
be a natural fall in private sector confidence and willingness to invest in 
the productive sectors of the economy; the Saudi businessman is well 
aware of the importance of government programmes to ·stimulate 
demand within the country. 15 
Interaction with the private sector 
For the past 10 years the driving force behind the Saudi Arabian 
economy has been government expenditures on construction contracts. 
Through government expenditures oil revenues have been deployed 
both to add to the nation's capital by investments in economic and social 
infrastructure products and to create consumer demand for a wide range 
of commodities, ranging from cement to office furniture, from 
foodstuffs to electronics, and from industrial machinery to motor 
vehicles. 16 
The Saudi government has sought to ensure that members of the 
Saudi business community benefit, either as agents putting together 
contracts, as agents importing goods and services as main or sub-
contractors, or as shareholders in banks, transport and other service 
companies. It required no sophisticated foresight to see that 'the 
government could not continue to fuel the economy by expenditures on 
public sector construction contracts indefinitely, if for no other reason 
that that there is a physical upper limit to the amount of economic 
infrastructure that any society requires. 
Long before the impact of a dramatic fall in oil revenues began to 
dawn on the Saudi business community, ministers and officials were 
warning that the construction sector would begin to decline both in 
relative and in absolute terms. 17 The sequence of events in Saudi Arabia 
was as follows: 
e Between 1976 and 1980 the oil sector declined as a percentage of 
GDP from 50.1 % to 42.2%. 
e Construction remained the second largest contributor to GDP 
between 1976/1977 and 1980/1981, but the relative share of the 
sector peaked at 10.9% and has since shown a steady fall, which can 
be expected to become more pronounced in the immediate future. 
e The wholesale and retail trade sector has now become the second 
largest contributor to GDP, increasing its share from 7.3% ·in 
' 1976/77 to 12.1 % by 1980-81. 
e Similarly, transport storage and communications have increased 
their share of GDP from 4.9% in 1976/77 to 6.3% in 1980/81. 
Thus Saudi Arabia, like Kuwait and Bahrain, is developing a service 
economy in spite of attempts to broaden the industrial base. Even when 
the heavy industrial plants now being built in Jubail and Yanbu are fully 
operational in 1986, the service sectors - transport, storage, com-
munication, finance, industrial real estate and business services - are 
likely to remain the most dynamic. 
This is not surprising given the mercantile traditions of the Arabian 
peninsula, the basic preferences of the people and the narrow market 
for much local industrial production which can only remain competitive 
behind protectionist policies. 18 
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More specifically, when the Saudi government appeals to the local 
business community to pick up some of the burden of future 
development and to make use of the excellent modern economic 
infrastructure, as well as of the capital acquired over the last ten years of 
sustained and dramatic growth to invest in the future of Saudi Arabia, 
the great majority of Saudi entrepreneurs look to investment in, for 
example, management maintenance and other service undertakings as 
well as in banking and other financial services. 
Even without a drop in oil revenues, the Saudi economy would have 
been entering a new phase in the early 1980s. In any case, some of the 
more traditional Saudi entrepreneurs would have been slow to adapt to 
the new challenge of business within the country and some of the 
smaller, less well managed Saudi companies would have gone out of 
business. Any slow-down causing economic stagnation or consolidation, 
or even recession, might follow a· significant drop in government 
expenditures and will merely serve to accentuate this underlying trend. 
As noted in the previous section, it is by no means certain that the fall 
in oil revenues will be immediately and automatically translated into a 
commensurate drop in government expenditure. The government will 
seek to cushion the economy by drawing down financial reserves. Saudi 
ministers and officials have always maintained that the growing financial 
surpluses which sometimes were something of an embarrassment would 
be needed one day, probably sooner rather than later, to sustain the 
domestic economy. 
The Saudi government has not shown any enthusiasm for the Kuwaiti 
policy of building a long-term portfolio fund for future generations, and 
has always sought to keep a sizeable part of its foreign assets in easily 
marketable instruments. 
An IMF figure suggests that the foreign assets of the Saudi Arabian 
Monetary Agency (SAMA) were marginally in excess of $140 billion at 
the end of 1982. Bank analysts say that this total is broken down roughly 
as one third short- and long-term bank deposits, one third longer-term 
loans to the Japanese, West German and French governments, for 
example, and various government and corporate bonds, and one third in 
liquid assets such as IMF contributions, soft loans and loans to, for 
example, Iraq where early payment is unlikely. 
Bankers' estimates put the total of Saudi private setor, including 
commercial bank, foreign assets at the end of 1982 at about $35 
billion.19 
In the first three months of 1983 SAMA did not renew a number of 
foreign bank deposits and it is virtually certain that this process will 
continue. ~he government also seems to be managing its cash flow by 
delaying at least some of its payments to contractors. For example, in 
the first quarter of 1983 the normal payment delay of 30--60 days had 
been extended to 90-120 days, although some government agencies 
were continuing to pay promptly .. 
Fast free spending policies have left a legacy of commitments to 
ongoing projects which are impervious to threats of budget costs. A 
momentum of government expenditure has been built up which will 
take more than one year's austerity to slow down. 
In this context, the treaty on economic cooperation is now being 
implemented by the six governments of the Gulf Council for Coopera-
tion (GCC). The GCC economic treaty is more closely related to the 
'
9Alec Thomas, op cit, Ref 16. development of a service economy in the region of the Gulf than it is to 
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a manufacturing based regional economy. Thus new business in Saudi 
Arabia will gradually cease to be totally dependent on new government 
contracts, and will become more and more interested in using Saudi 
Arabia's excellent infrastructure and very substantial capital base to 
create regionally oriented investment opportunities in the service 
industries. 20 
Problems in forecasting oil exports 
Saudi Arabia's sustainable oil production capacity is currently about 10 
million bbl/day. While there has been considerable speculation in the 
past that Saudi Arabia might increase sustainable capacity to 12 million 
bbl/day, or even higher, there are no indications that the development 
programme necessary for such an increase has been - or is likely to be -
put into motion in the foreseeable future. What is more likely is that 
Saudi Arabia will engage in a limited programme to increase output 
from the oil fields producing medium and heavy crudes, thereby 
increasing total sustainable capacity by another 1 million bbl/day to 11 
million bbl/day by 1990.21 
A number of technical, political and market considerations have 
dictated a somewhat conservative approach to the development of Saudi 
Arabia's vast resource base.22 These considerations similarly motivated 
the imposition of a production ceiling of 8.5 million bbl/day in the 19-70s, 
with some deviation above the ceiling in the w~ke of the Iranian 
revolution and later the Iran-Iraq war. In the spring of 1982 Saudi 
Arabia's allowable level was lowered - at least temporarily- to 7 million 
bbl/day in support of the decision by the other twelve OPEC members 
to establish a production sharing programme. The higher 8.5 million 
bbl/day allowable production rate is expected to be restored as world 
demand for OPEC oil begins to recover. Given rising domestic oil 
consumption, an allowable of 8.5 million bbl/day would translate into oil 
export availability from Saudi Arabia of 7.7 million bbl/day in 1985 and 
7.5 million bbl/day in 1990. Within this context, there are two sets of 
countervailing pressures affecting Saudi Arabia's oil policies. On the 
one hand Saudi Arabia is under constant outside pressure - real or 
perceived - to maintain a high or at least flexible allowable level. Much 
of this pressure comes from the USA which implicitly, if not explicitly, 
sets Saudi Arabia's 'moderation' on oil issues (defined as high 
production and low prices) as a precondition for its continued support 
for the present regime and for its guarantees of territorial integrity. 
While Saudi Arabia now has a fundamental interest in the economic 
a~d political stability of the Western industrialized nations, it is also true 
that Saudi Arabia is not interested in destroying the economies of the 
industrialized world or their assets, the same being true of the other 
OPEC countries. Moreover, it is not clear that either a more aggressive 
Saudi Arabian policy on oil pricing or, alternatively, a more restrained 
policy on oil output would play havoc with the rest of the world. In any 
case, Saudi Arabia's interest in the economic well-being of other 
countries plays a minor role in determining its oil policies:23 
Finally, as noted above, the argument is often made that Saudi 
Arabia's budget needs dictate large production levels. But these needs 
are often misunderstood and misinterpreted. In particular, the confu-
sion between domestic currency and foreign exchange needs has created 
major overestimates of Saudi Arabia's oil revenue requirements. 24 
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Saudi Arabian officials have hinted that, at prevailing prices, the 
present pace of development could be sustained with oil exports of just 
over 5 million bbl/day and exports could even go lower. In 1982 Saudi 
Arabia's return on its massive foreign assets approached $20 billion -
equivalent to almost 2 million bbl/day in oil exports. Moreover, Saudi 
Arabia can slow down construction of numerous industrial and 
infrastructure projects with negligible impact on the economy since 
many of these projects are located in industrial enclaves with no real 
linkage to the domestic economy. 
Saudi Arabia can also draw down its foreign reserves. In the event of 
this it is probably pointless to attempt to project Saudi Arabia's future 
oil export targets on the basis of revenue needs alone; annual budgets 
and five year development plans provide only broad, flexible guidelines 
and only rarely do the actual numbers even match. 
However, external pressures for ever-rising Saudi Arabian oil exports 
at low prices are at least somewhat balanced by arguments for a less 
accommodating approach to oil policy. 
While a revolution in Saudi Arabia similar to the one which occurred 
in Iran is considered unlikely at present, discontent, particularly among 
the educated middle classes, is apparent. Even within the royal family 
there are those who believe that the open embrace of the USA is not in 
the best interest of the country. The dissidents argue that the USA has 
been unwilling or unable to deliver a solution to the Palestinian problem 
and that Saudi Arabia's overt friendship with Israel's . main ally 
destabilizes the regime and gives the appearance that Saudi Arabia is 
merely a US puppet. These groups do not necessarily advocate a break 
with' the USA, but they do call for a more independent Saudi Arabian 
policy, of which reduced oil production and exports would be an 
important actual manifestation. 
There are also other technical factors in favour of reducing oil output. 
First, Saudi Arabia's proven reserves of light oil are being depleted 
more rapidly than those of the medium and heavy varieties. The country 
has thus sought to change its historic export mix of around 65% light: 
35% medium/heavy to an equal mix. In early 1982 a number of new 
sales and 'incentive crude' contracts were based on this newer 50:50 
ratio. Achieving such a ratio would necessitate a reduction in total oil 
production to about 6--6.5 million bbl/day unless plans to increase heavy 
oil production were implemented on schedule. Second, Saudi Arabia's 
Master Gas System - a massive $20 billion natural gas gather project -
cannot utilize associated gas output beyond an estimated 7 .3 million 
bbl/day o( oil output. Any additional output of associated gas would 
have to be flared and wasted. 
On balance it appears that Saudi Arabia's preferred level of outline 
ouput or allowable will remain at the 8.5 million bbl/day level. The 8.5 
million bbl/day allowable not only provides what is viewed as a 
reasonable compromise between the advocates of high and low 
production targets but has also taken on a momentum of its own. 
Of course, if the present Saudi Arabian regime was replaced by 
one which was substantially different, production could be lowered 
significantly, at least initially. Subsequently, depending on political 
and economic priorities, it is not inconceivable that even a radically 
different regime might reinstate the previous production targets, 
much as the Islamic government in Iran will in all likelihood 
eventually do. 
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Mechanisms of growth 
25See, for example, G.W. Bertram, 'The 
relevance of the Canadian wheat boom in 
Canadian economic growth', Canadian 
Journal of Economics, August 1973; and 
R.E. Caves, 'Export lead growth and the 
new economic history', in J. Bhagwati, 
Trade, Balance of Payments and Growth, 
Essays in Honor of Charles P. Kindieber-
ger, North Holland, Amsterdam, 1971, pp 
433-442. 
26Raymond Mikesell, 'The contribution of 
petroleum and mineral resources to eco-
nomic development', in Raymond 
Mikesell, ed, Foreign Investment in the 
Petroleum and Mineral Industries, The 
Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1971, pp 
3-28. 
27 An exhaustive analysis is given in G. 
Nankani, 'Development problems of 
mineral-exporting countries', in World 
Bank, World Bank Staff Working Paper No 
354, August 1979. 
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The manner in which exports act as a leading sector, and the 
determinants of the overall impact of changes in exports on national 
economies have been discussed in the literature for some time.25 The 
concensus amongst economists seems to be that exports can contribute 
to economic growth through their direct contribution to gross domestic 
product, since they are included as part of GDP, and, indirectly, 
through linkages created with non-oil sectors in a sequence of multiplier 
accelerator mechanisms. Theoretically, these indirect contributions to 
the economy may continue to operate long after a particular change in 
exports has occurred. 26 
Thus, while the petroleum sector may not participate directly in the 
buying and selling of goods in the domestic market, as was historically 
the case for the leading export growth sectors, it may still act as they did 
in providing an engine of growth for the economy, rather than providing 
a direct effect through large backward and forward linkages. The 
mechanism may be one of a series of demand responses that result 
once the sector's revenues begin to interact with the rest of the 
economy. 
In sum, the overall impact of a change in exports will depend on, first, 
changes in technology that result, second, the propensity to import, 
third, the extent to which investment opportunities are generated, 
fourth, the ability to attract foreign investors and, finally, other 
non-quantitative effects. Obviously, neither the exhibited nor the 
relative sizes of exports' direct and indirect contributions to the growth 
of the economy need to be fixed and could conceivably vary between 
different time periods. Clearly, if the opportunities generated by the 
growth of the export sector are exploited then a pattern of economic 
growth will evolve and will be characterized as a process of diversifica-
tion about an export base. 27 
While the relationship between the growth of oil exports and the 
growth of GDP over time is central to an export base model of growth, 
the literature has never been specific as to the operational nature of this 
relationship; ie exactly what effect the time period or time pattern of 
changes in exports might have on income. The problem of determining 
the time lag between oil export growth and economic growth in Saudi 
Arabia must therefore be central to any econometric investigation that 
attempts to forecast the economy's likely growth path. 
More precisely, to have any credibility at all a forecasting model of 
the Saudi Arabian economy must identify to what extent demand 
inereasing effects stemming from petroleum revenues have induced 
movements in the country's indigenous (non-oil) income. Therefore, as 
a first step in constructing an econometric model of the economy, an 
attempt was made to statistically estimate the manner in which the oil 
sector has interacted with the rest of the economy. 
Empirical formulation of export base theory 
It is quite likely that because the government need not spend its oil 
revenues immediately after they ac~rue but can instead build up a 
foreign portfolio in order to sustain expenditures during years of falling 
revenues, oil exports will have an impact on GDP over time rather than 
instantaneously. One formulation would be to specify GDP in the 
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28From a general formulation elaborated 
on in M. Dutta, Econometric Methods, 
South Western Publishing Co, Cincinnati, 
1975, Chapter 7. 
29As proven in L.M. Koyck, Distributed 
Lags and Investment Analysis, North-
Holland, Amsterdam, 1954. 
30Dutta, op cit, Ref 28, p 189. 
31 Following M.M. Metwally and H.V. 
Tamaschke, 'Oil exports and economic 
growth in the Middle East', Kyklos, No 3, 
1980, pp 499-521. 
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current period as depending not on exports during that period (year) but 
also on the series. This formulation implies that the impact of exports 
goes back a certain number of years,28 ie: 
GDPN = b0EXPTNA + b_1EXPTNAL + b2EXPTNAL2 . . . (1) 
where GDNP is GDP (current price), EXPTNA is nominal exports, 
EXPTNAL is exports lagged one year, EXPTNAL2 is exports lagged 
two years, and so on. 
In this form there are an indefinitely large number of parameters to 
be estimated - b0 , b1, b2 • • • This is clearly impractical if not statistically 
impossible. It is therefore necessary to make some simplifying assump-
tions. A priori, the most reasonable would be to assume that the impact 
on current GDP of previous exports declines exponentially, ie exports in 
period a have an impact b on GDP in periods but only impact ba in 
period t+ 1, ba2 in period t+ 2, and so on. This formulation implies that 
the impact of exports on GDP would decline over time in a systematic 
manner. 
Using this framework Equation (1) can be written as: 
GDNP = bEXPTNA + baEXPTNAL + ba2EXPTNAL2 . . . (2) 
which can be simplied to a form easily estimated:29 
GDNP = b(l -a) + bEXPTNA + aGDPNL (3) 
The value of b can be obtained from the estimated value of t~e intercept 
and a from the GDPNL term, where GDNP =GDP, and GDPNL = 
GDP lagged one year. 
Iri addition to estimating the value of a using Equation (3), we can 
measure the impact on GDP due to a change in exports for both short-
and long-term analysis. The impact multiplier measuring the instan-
tanous effect of a change in exports on GDP is calculated by using b. It 
can be shown that the equilibrium multiplier or long-run multiplier 
measuring the change in equilibrium value of GDP due to a change in 
exports is calculated by: 
b/(1-a)30 ( 4) 
The relationship of oil to GDP was calculated using this framework. For 
a number of theoretical reasons both GDP and exports were calculated 
as the percentage rate of change from year to year. Theoretically this 
function makes sense31 because, firstly, the spread effects include 
acceleration effects and thus proper specification requires some concept 
of chang~ and, secondly, we would not expect exports to have a constant 
impact on the economy over time (as the economy undergoes structural 
changes). The percentage annual change was approximated by taking 
the natural logarithm of the change from one year to the next in each 
variable. 
The results for GDP for the period 1960--1978 were: 
ln(GDPNIGDPNL) = 0.7424ln(EXPTNAIEXPTNAL) 
(194.76) 
+ 0.1369 ln(GDPNLIGDPNL2) + 0.0248 
(3.5710) (5) 
r 2 = 0.9341 F = 99.1676 
with ( ) = partial F values, In = natural logarithm· and non-oil GDP 
(NOXN) for 196(}-1978. 
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test is given in N.R. Draper and H. Smith, 
Applied Regression Analysis, John Wiley, 
New York, 1966, p 71. 
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ln(NOXN/NOXNL) = 0.1817ln(EXPTNAIEXPTNAL) 
(1.5926) 
+ 0.819ln(NOXNL/NOXNL2) + 0.0015 
(29.8601) (6) 
r 2 = 0.6920 F = 15.7264 
For Equation (5), b = 0.7424 and a = 0.1369, yielding a· long-run 
multiplier of 0.8602. For Equation (6), b = 0.1817 and a = 0.8196, 
yielding a long-run multiplier of 1.0072; ie for each dollar increase in oil 
exports, there is in the long run a corresponding $1.0072 increase in 
non-oil GDP. 
It should be noted that in Equation (5) the second term depicting the 
effect of past exports yielding the b multiplier is just barely significant at 
the 90% level by the partial F test. 32 
These results indicate that current exports are extremely important in 
determining GDP. The spread effects, however, are questionable. 
Perhaps a more meaningful result is that obtained when non-oil GDP is 
used in place of GDP. Non-oil GDP is highly significant by the Ftest in 
the regression equation, thus indicating that spread effects were in fact 
very important in Saudi Arabia during the period and that investment 
opportunities generated by the oil revenues were being exploited to 
advantage. 
For the pre-1973 price increase period (1960-1973), the results were: 
ln(GDPN!GDPNL) = 0.6194ln(EXPTNAIEXPTNAL) 
(22.4272) 
+ 0.1009 ln(GDPNL/GDPNL2)+ 0.0369 
(0.1412) (7) 
r 2 = 0.7149 F = 11.2842 
With the lagged export effect insignificant and for non-oil GDP: 
ln(NOXNINOXNL) = 0.2015 ln(EXPTNA/EXPTNAL) 
(4.1966) 
+ 0.0463 ln(NOXNL/NOXNL2) + 0.0761 
(0.0142) (8) 
r2 = 0.3187 F = 2.1054 
For the pre-OPEC price increase period, the spread effects of oil 
exports were statistically insignificant, even taking a negative sign in 
Equation (8). Apparently, since 1973 the country has become much 
more efficient in channelling export derived revenues into productive 
investment. 
'Io examine the hypothesis that exports stimulate the Saudi Arabian 
economy through a spread effect that takes place over a rather long 
period of time (as opposed to a very transitory stimulus), the export 
income relationship was specified as: 
ln(NOXNP) =Bl+ b2ln(EIEJ) + b3ln(EJIEL2) 
+ b4ln(E12/EL3) + b5ln(EL3/EJ4) (9) 
where E = EXPTNAR = current price exports deflated by the import 
price index. The advantage of this formulation is that it makes no 
presumption as to the pattern of weights used to determine the impact 
of past exports on real non-oil GDP (NOXNP). 
Results of regressing both constant and current price non-oil GDP on 
lagged exports confirm the general results obtained above (see Table 1). 
For the constant price case, exports do not have a significant impact 
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Table 1. Impact of exports on non-oil GDP in Saudi Arabia. 
In In In In In In 
(EIEL) (EUEL2) (EL21EL3) (EL3/EL4) (EL41EL5} (EL5/EL6) Interest ,a F Equation 
Constant prices 
ln(NOXNPINOXNPL) 0.0166 0.1001 0.0076 0.1294 (10) • 
(0.01294) 
ln(NOXNPINOXNPL) 0.0242 0.0254 0.0923 0.0351 0.2544 (11) 
(0.3052) (0.2036) 
ln(NOXNP!NOXNPL) 0.0218 0.0064 0.1289 0.0774 0.4519 3.2983 (12) 
(0.3175) (0.3981) (9.1792) 
ln(NOXNP!NOXNPL) 0.0095 0.0206 0.1131 0.1036 0.0602 0.7139 6.2371 (13) 
(0.5173) (0.7189) (14.6695) (9.0429) 
ln(NOXNP!NOXNPL) 0.0532 0.0001 0.1275 0.0843 0.0835 0.0421 0.8375 8.0109 (14) 
(0.6945) (0.9812) (20.3886) (12.4363) (5.5538) 
ln(NOXNP!NOXNPL) 0.0929 0.0381 0.0463 0.0620 0.1140 0.2960 0.0068 0.8747 6.9804 (15) 
(0.0009) (0.5027) (13.5029) (10.7391) (15.6837) (1.4533) 
Current prices 
ln(NOXN!NOXNL) 0.1259 0.1672 0.0356 0.5913 (16) 
(0.5913) 
ln(NOXN!NOXNL) -0.0507 0.5014 0.0950 0.5034 7.0958 (17) 
(0.9878) (13.2038) 
ln(NOXNINOXNL) -0.0330 0.3554 0.3734 0.0476 0.7863 14.7210 (18) 
(1.4875) ( 27.4154) (15.2600) 
ln(NOXN!NOXNL) -0.0765 0.4020 0.2434 0.3496 -0.0009 0.9564 54.820 (19) 
(4.8957) (100.7798) (63.2990) (50.3375) 
Note: NOXNP =real non-oil GDP; NOXNPL =real non-oil GDP lagged one year; NOXNPL2 =real non-oil GDP lagged two years, etc.; NOXN =current 
price non-oil GDP; E = exports; real non-oil GDP is regressed on exports deflated by the import price index; current price non-oil GDP is regressed on 
undeflated exports. 
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until after two years; then they are significant for three and four year 
lags, but are insignificant for a lag of five years. Exports also decline in 
strength with lags of two, three and four years (Equation 14, Table 1). 
For the current price case a similar pattern emerges, although exports 
have a significant impact on income after only a one year lag. 
Also, the evidence of declining weights of past exports is not as strong 
as in the constant price case; ie exports lagged by one, two and three 
years have fairly similar coefficients (Equation 19, Table 1). 
A somewhat different picture emerges, however, when exports are 
regressed on individual sector output (eg agriculture, etc). In this 
formulation exports were not significant in any of the equations using 
sector value added as the dependent variable. This indicates weak direct 
linkages, oand means that these sectors' growth patterns were indepen-
dent of fluctuations in exports. Manufacturing output, for example, may 
be largely of the import substitution variety, and thus responds to the 
general level of domestic demand. These findings may also indicate that 
the full potential of exports in stimulating an expansion of manufactur-
ing output has not been fully exploited, perhaps because of insufficient 
domestic market size. An alternative explanation is that the overall 
results (using non-oil GDP) are significant, while the results for the 
individual sectors (whose values add up to the non-oil GDP total) are 
not significant simply because the lag structure is complex and 
somewhat staggered over time. 
Again, at the aggregate level an analysis of capital stock and 
investment patterns shows a clear relationship with export changes over 
time. 
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33The following tests follow Metwally and 
Tamaschke, op cit, Ref 31. 
34Y. Kurabayashi, The impact of changes 
in terms of trade on a system of national 
accounts: an attempted synthesis', Review 
of Income and Wealth, 1971, pp 285-97. 
35See Paul Davidson, 'Causality in econo-
mies, a review', Journal of Post Keynesian 
Economics, Summer 1980, pp 576-584, 
for an excellent discussion of this point. 
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ln(FKP/FKPL) = 0.1495 ln(EIEL) +0.7467ln(FKPLIFKPL2) 
(0.6210) (15.0174) 
+ 0.0224 (20) 
r 2 = 0.5658 F = 7.8192 
where FKP = real capital stock (defined as the sum of total investment 
in year t + investment in the previous two years); E and EL = real 
exports (nominal exports deflated by the import price index) and lagged 
real exports, respectively. The ( ) terms are the partial F values. 




r 2 = 0.2705 F =.2.5963 
where FT/NP = real investment. 
(21) 
Current period exports are not significant determinants of either 
capital stock or investment, while the lagged export term is highly 
significant for the capital stock, but only significant at the 90% level for 
investment. Apparently, expansion of current exports is not necessary 
for the growth of capital and may indicate that the country has enough 
reserves to finance its current investment needs; ie that short-run 
fluctuations in export earnings need not impair the country's develop-
ment plans. 
These results also suggest that much of Saudi" Arabia's capital 
accumulation takes place in industries whose output does not depend 
significantly on growth in exports ( eg, infrastructure and/or investment 
in import substitutes for which demand is readily available). From what 
we know of the economy, it is also apparent that the results simply 
reflect the fact that much of the country's investment is in projects with 
very long gestation periods, such as those being undertaken at Jubail. 
Again there is always the possibility that some imported capital goods 
may not be fully utilized due to domestic market limitations. Clearly, for 
many industries even a massive expansion of exports would not be 
enough to give the required volume of sales or to create enough demand 
to justify the economic establishment of a good number of manufactur-
ing industries. 
It is possible that because these results were derived from current 
price data, they may exhibit an inflationary bias. To suppress the 
inflationary effect, the relationship between exports and both GDP and 
non-oil GDP was tested in constant prices (but allowing for improve-
m~nts in the terms of trade).33 Thus GDP was deflated with the GDP 
deflator (1970 = 100) and exports by an index of import prices. 
Deflating exports in this manner is preferable to using an index of 
export prices, since any rise in the price of exports relative to that of 
imports (ie an import bent in the terms of trade) reflects a true gain to 
the economy. 34 
For non-oil GDP, the results are similar to those above. For 
1960-1978: 
ln(NOXNPINOXNPL) = 0.0392ln(EXPTNARIEXPTNARL) 
(0.3959) 
+ 0.4950ln(NOXNPLINOXNPL2) + 0.0452 
(4.4270) (22) 
r 2 = 0.2562 F = 2.4114 
RESOURCES POLICY June 1984 
RESOURCES POLICY June 1984 
Methodological considerations in forecasting Saudi Arabian economic growth 
and for 1960-1973: 
ln(NOXNP/NOXNPL) = 0.0807 ln(EXPTNARIEXPTNARL) 
(1.7736) 
+ 0.1419 ln(NOXNPL/NOXNPL2) + 0.0825 
(0.1203) (23) 
r2 = 0.1171 F = 0.5907 
with NOXNP = real non-oil GDP, EXPTNAR = real exports. 
Again, the results are strikingly different, indicating that for real 
non-oil GDP (but not total GDP) the spread effects are quite 
significant. As with the current price case, this pattern appears to be a 
fairly recent phenomenon. If the 1960-1973 period is examined 
separately, the spread effect is not significant (the sign of the lagged 
non-oil income term is in fact negatiye). 
Conclusions 
Do the empirical tests prove that the country's oil revenues have created 
numerous incentives for the non-oil sector, and that that sector has 
responded in a manner which has generated spread and linkage effects 
through the economy? As is well known, statistical analysis can only be 
used to reject a hypothesis. Analysis of the sort presented above can 
never prove a hypothesis to be correct.35 As such, the empirical results 
examined above go a long way in disproving the idea that· the Saudi 
Arabian petroleum sector has had only a short-run, transitory stimulat-
ing impact on the domestic economy and that the country has not taken 
the ieast advantage of some of the investment possibilities made 
possible by the revenues generated by this sector. It appears that 
changes in the level of exports have a number of impacts on the non-oil 
sector of the economy which take some time to have their full effect felt. 
The role of the government during the next few years is likely to 
continue to be constrained along the lines established during the Fifth 
Plan period: 
e designing a domestic infrastructure network capable of supporting a 
modem industrial apparatus; 
e implementing health, welfare and education policies necessary for 
maintaining the human element in the development process while at 
the same time contributing to improvements in labour and 
managerial quality; 
e investing in selected heavy industries into which the private sector is 
reluctant to venture; 
e guiding the future spatial configuration of population and economic 
activity through locational investment decisions. 
The continued increasing role of government in the economy is simply a 
logical consequence of the development strategy already adopted by the 
government and the constraints facing Saudi planners. Government 
activity will continue to be directed toward economic activities which 
the private sector will be reluctant to enter into due to the risk involved 
or the size of the investment required. 
In essence, the government will continue to face the basic problem of 
utilizing its petroleum revenues to support consumption; while ensuring 
that eventual self-sustained growth is achieved. This perception of Saudi 
Arabia's growth process will be incorporated into the forecasting model 
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through the separation of the petroleum sector from the remainder of 
the economy. As noted, linkages (forward and backward) between the 
petroleum industry and other sectors of the economy are minimal and, 
consequently, the influence of the economy on the petroleum sector is 
negligible, as is the direct influence of that sector on the rest of the 
economy . 
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